Future trends and possibilities. Part 1

Many of the blog posts have looked at the constraints of a nuclear expansion – here I am going to look at the benefits as well as the current trends for nuclear energy to increase in the coming years. The current electric production from nuclear amounts to 11% of global demand (WNA 2015). This is provided by 435 reactors producing 375,000 MWe energy. From 1990-2010 the global production increased around 18%, this increasing trend therefore promotes the strong possibility that further future expansions are likely to amount. 70 reactors are currently under construction which would provide an extra 20% of the current electricity capacity (WNA 2015) – showing signs that the nuclear future is emerging already.

Electricity production trend - general increase since the 1970s. Slight decline in the 2010s is likely attributable to the closures following the Fukushima disaster (WNA 2015).

Many governments have plans for the future increases for example the UK government in 2006 applied plans to replace the ageing reactors with new ones, to continue a reliance on nuclear – along with new reactors to increase the capacity further, including Hinkley Point C (WNA 2015). Not only are there plans for expansions in counties that have had a long history of nuclear such as France and the UK, but also many new countries are looking to exploit nuclear such as Vietnam and Turkey. Another example in the Middle East, Iran has recently establishing its first power station and the UAE are central to the construction of 3 South Korean 1,450 Mwe reactors (WNA 2015). The capacity as well as the spatial scope of nuclear energy is therefore enhancing currently – progressing to a larger nuclear future?

Current levels of nuclear generation per country (WNA 2015).

The Bushehr Nuclear Plant in Iran - which opened in 2010 (Guardian 2010).

The economic investment risk is substantial in nuclear plant construction, therefore it will often be seen that governmental aid or regulation is essential for the private nuclear sector to fund nuclear projects. For example the Price Anderson Act in the US caps private insurance costs at $200 million, otherwise if costs were allowed to be classified in relation to the possible risks the expenditures would likely be too high for profitability to be achieved (Balzani 2006). The Bush government asked Congress for a $40 billion fund for a project known as “Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (Balzani 2006). The plan would be to provide nuclear potential to developing countries that would not have the internal funds necessary to self-sufficiently manage a nuclear energy sector. The agreement would see spent fuel returned to the supplier nation, which may be seen as a national security precaution. What this programme provided was the potential for the vast expansion of nuclear on a global scale – yet at the same time it could be argued that the autonomy of developing nations was reduced and that a dependency on the US and their regulations and rules increased (Balzani 2006). Moral and political dilemmas may arise from this trade-off, which could potentially delay or prevent the nuclear growth.

The US desire for a nuclear future was further displayed by the Obama government providing $8.3 billion funding for two new reactors – whilst once again going to Congress for a further $36 billion to fund similar reactor setup projects. This financial assistance is required to allow the nuclear expansion but also to allow nuclear to be economically competitive against fossil fuels (Ferguson 2010). Another way that has been suggested to drive a greater level of nuclear competiveness is through carbon pricing/taxing (Ferguson 2010). Placing a value on the emissions will allow for the environmental costs to be included within cost-benefit analyses within businesses. With the increased economic damages of “dirty fuels” a greater demand for nuclear will be provided.

Ferguson (2010) also suggests that merging alliances will provide greater investor opportunities – especially needed within the US where a lack of state owned utilities means private investment is essential. An example being the global connections between French EDF and the US Company Constellation Energy. Similar global alliances have recently been seen with EDF selling a share in the Hinkley C, Somerset project to the state owned China General Nuclear Power (Farrell 2015) – arguably global funding may be the future for such wider expansions of nuclear energy to be achieved!

Global alliances, such as that between the UK and China, may become a common theme in future nuclear investments (Guardian 2015). 

The UK government has ensured a minimum electricity price to EDF for Hinkley Point C at £89.50 per MW/hr for 35 years (BBC 2015), due to the need for a guaranteed return to promote the initial private investment. Similar guarantees were also put in place to entice the Chinese investors. It may be argued that this cost is relatively high compared to the $40-$50 cost of a barrel of oil – however when placed in comparison to other renewable energy products it would appear relatively reasonable (BBC 2015). The issue being that these governmental subsidies and guarantees will be required to allow for the construction and economic competitivity, otherwise higher initial costs are likely to mitigate its demand. There is an inability for nuclear to function within a free market, that otherwise it will continually be out-competed by the more environmentally damaging, yet cheaper energy resources (The Economist 2015).

Price per Mw/h - displaying the guaranteed price for Hinkley C electricity to be reasonable in relation to alternate renewable sources (BBC 2015).

Nuclear energy costs are often far more stable in relation to fossil fuel fluctuations, however the efficiencies and therefore the costs between nuclear plants tend to be variable (The Economist 2015). For example the US cost of nuclear production is $24/MWh on average, which is lower than both coal and gas – however variability in such costs either side of this average means such benefits are not always widely experienced. Additionally, there is the threat of ever increasingly cheap fossil fuels, including the declining US gas prices. With the high setup costs for nuclear it would appear as if the US is likely to rely on the economically viable gas option in the coming years (The Economist 2015). Despite the governmental assistance towards nuclear energy, it is claimed that in the West there is a preference to subsidise alternate renewable sources that are major competitors to the nuclear potential (The Economist 2015). This is likely to be a product of political and public acceptance of solar and wind over nuclear. Subsidising acceptable energy sources will allow for greater governmental support than funding a sector that many see as a potential risk.

Balzani (2006) suggests that for nuclear energy to significantly provide for future global energy needs it would need to continually produce energy up to 10TW, this would therefore require 10,000 1 Gwe power plants to be built – if such significant contributions are going to be achieved then a new reactor would have to be opened every other day for the next 50 years. This statement lacks substance, I am not entirely sure what a “significant contribution” is, however it does highlight the lack of current nuclear potential. This emphasises its role as a background, baseline provider, that major expansions will be needed if it is to become a dominant energy source. Such construction requirements seem impossible, yet evidence to show that a new power reactor was started every 17 days in the 1980s does provide some hope for a rapid change to be possible (WNA 2015). The estimates for contemporary potential from the WNA (2015), claims that a 1Gwe plant opening every 5 days is feasible – therefore this displays the ability to potentially significantly contribute within short periods of time. This rapid production ability is important – as climatic change concerns become ever more urgent as potential thresholds are being approached. The more rapid the response in reducing the emissions, the lower magnitude the peak temperature increase will be (IPCC 2007). Climatic change is arguably inevitable with the current atmospheric composition, yet a reduction as soon as possible will mitigate the damage already caused!

Nuclear predictions under different scenarios (Hill 2008).

Is nuclear a waste of time? Part 2

The costs of waste disposal are vast, often accounting for 10% of the overall pricing (WNA 2015). Costs are contextually variable yet persistently high, with the waste disposal including the costs in exploration of suitable geologically stable sites, the engineering needs for the storage and also administrative costs to name a few (IAEA 2014). For example the lowest expenditure was $1.1 billion by India and the greatest was a staggering $19.5 billion spent by South Korea (IAEA 2014).

Costs of nuclear waste disposal for South Korea (IAEA 2014).

One of the answers is reprocessing, with it claimed in 2000 by the British Nuclear Fuel that 97% of nuclear waste can be recycled and reused (BBC 2000). Whether this potential is capable of being fulfilled however is another question. The reprocessing is predominantly focused on the conversion of “fertile uranium to fissile plutonium” (WNA 2015) – with it believed that an extra 25-30% of energy can be derived from the uranium that has already been processed initially. This would tie in with the previous blog on the costs of nuclear energy, as more energy would be generated for every $ spent of excavation for uranium for example.

Three general methods of reprocessing are available from the use of heat; electric currents or fluids in order to seperate the metals and allow access to the plutonium which can be engaged with as fuel (WNA 2015). The per $ excavation improvements however are seen to be made redundant by the fact that reprocessing is currently not economically viable within the French EDF company (WNA2015). That due to the impurities in uranium then the conversion costs are often 3x greater than the use of new uranium – this may therefore limit reprocessing and reduced global waste from being achieved on a vast scale. However, it may be seen that once the uranium stores are depleted this may force reprocessing as an essential practice; the necessity may provide the stimulus for innovation and reduced costs which may allow for greater reprocessing opportunities.

The lack of economic viability may explain for the limited level of global reprocessing – with the current global capacity at 4,500 tonnes of waste a year – compared to the 300 million tonnes that are produced each year ONLY from OECD countries (WNA 2015). Arguably, this shows the near negligible ability reprocessing currently has, but it must also be acknowledged as a step in the correct direction. The policies of waste are internationally variable with the UK and France promoting reprocessing, compared to Canada and Sweden for example that have policies in place for disposal (WNA 2015). The USA is seen to have a prevention of reprocessing that was put in place in 1974 under the presidency of Jimmy Carter (Forbes 2014). It was prevented due to the lack of cost-effectiveness and the danger of it being utilised as a threat to national security – however it seems ridiculous that a valuable resource is being wasted when it could aid the emission reductions of a country run by oil. The waste production would drop by 50% if the ban was lifted (Forbes 2014) – the USA more than anyone, with the vast emission production, is in drastic need of utilising every carbon-free resource available rather than simply “throwing it away”.

This leads to the difficult trade-off between safety and renewable energy – is the waste permanently sealed off in storage for safety purposes or is it left open, as it may become an increasingly valuable resource for future generations (WNA 2015).

Japan, as mentioned, has had a complicated relationship with nuclear energy for years – however despite large negativity from much of the public, two plants were agreed to be reopened in the Spring of this year (Normile 2015). The issue being that this will add further waste to the 17,000 tonnes that are currently within cooling pools. There is a strong desire for reprocessing yet the reprocessing plant constructions have been substantially delayed and therefore excess fuel will continue to be created – the planned opening is March 2016 (Normile 2015). The Redox extraction method looks to separate the useful uranium and plutonium from the used fuel, this would consequently vastly reduce the level of waste – however disposal of the highly radioactive residue byproduct will remain an issue. One method tested is vitrification where the by-product is inserted within glass – it is deemed more durable than the metal storage in commercial use. However, the complex chemistry and high costs are likely to limit its expanded use (Normile 2015). 

Such alternative storages are needed in particular within Japan due to the fact that the underground storage is prevented as geological stability is unlikely to persist for long periods due to the sensitivity of the global location – along with the negative stigma that has arisen from a history of nuclear disasters. This means many will oppose the storage of nuclear waste anywhere in their proximity (Normile 2015). NIMBYism therefore arises again. Furthermore, an ever increasing concern will be the room for storage if it is continually produced and in need of safe storage for 1000s of years. There is only limited areas of suitable geological stability where deep storage is permissible. This had led to some suggestions of disposing of waste in outer space (Burns 1978)!

Despite this there is hope! Research from the University of Sheffield claims the volume of waste could be reduced by up to 90% by using burn furnace slag from metal refineries in the vitrification process (UOS 2013). This would reduce previous vitrification costs and overcome the concern of limited storage space. Waste would be reduced using other waste, a win-win scenario!

Vitrification - the answer to nuclear waste storage concerns?

It is clear there is much room for potential growth within reprocessing which could ultimately end this particular critical attack of nuclear energy. Often the radioactivity longevity may be over exaggerated in the media and society - therefore the risks are unlikely to persist for as long as many fear. Despite this it remains a great issue, the trade off between permanent sealing for safety or providing access for future use is one of the largest challenges - predominantly due to future technological advances being unknown. My opinion here is that waste in inevitable within energy production whether it is nuclear, fossil fuels or even solar energy which is seen to produce toxic waste water and carbon emissions during the panel construction (Nunez 2011). If nuclear is going to be a stopgap before more acceptable renewable resources are capable of fulfilling demand then these challenges will only be temporary issues. Therefore, dealing with and accepting these problems - whether it is through increasing reprocessing efforts or continuing to safely store - is essential to receive the high levels of carbon free energy that are urgently required today.

Solar panel construction also contributes to high levels of waste (Nunez 2011).

An issue that will be expanded upon within the next few posts will be the link to warfare and terrorism, with nuclear waste production "tightly and ambiguously linked with weaponry technology" (Armaroli 2006). Costs and fears of waste disposal sites and nuclear plants are therefore further increased by the security measures required to limit such potential energy falling into the wrong hands?!

Is nuclear a "waste" of time? Part 1

Two of the major challenges that nuclear energy faces is the production and disposal of nuclear waste. Often the greatest concerns are attached to the high level waste which is made up of the used nuclear fuel (WNA 2015), with the inclusion of fission products (WNA 2015). However, this contributes 3% of the total waste, with 90% classified as low level which includes clothing or tools that may have experienced a minimal level of radioactive exposure (WNA2015). The issue being that Uranium-235/238 which is used within the energy production have half-lives of 704 million years and 4.46 billion years respectively (IEER 2012). Therefore the storage has to be secure for many years to prevent the radionuclide material entering the biosphere, which as seen from the two previous case studies can have substantial health risks. Often it is initially stored within water to both cool the waste and to act as a shield to the radioactivity (WNA 2015). Greenpeace, a publicised opponent to nuclear energy, uses the long-term decay to argue against the expansion of the sector. They suggest there is no guarantee that the dangerous material will not enter the environment over such a prolonged persistence (Greenpeace 2006).

Nuclear waste stored in a cooling pool (WNA 2015).

There has been evidence to support these claims, for example there is evidence of the corrosion resistance alloys, often used in the storage, being exposed to the risk of localised corrosion and consequent seepage (Feron 2008). The localised corrosion may be from exfoliation corrosion in relation to the surrounding sediment or “pitting” of the barrel’s surface if it is highly exposed (Frankel 2008). Furthermore evidence from Hanford, Manhattan showed how the seepage of nuclear waste into the groundwater caused large detrimental health effects (Hanson 2000). This would be a particular concern when looking at the potential for a wide scale nuclear expansion – with much of the arid and semi-arid parts of the world highly dependent on groundwater as a freshwater resource (Taylor 2013). Consequently, many may be reluctant to risk a decline in the vital resource's quality by introducing nuclear energy.

The susceptibility of the groundwater is due to the fact that much of the high level waste is stored in deep geological areas (WNA 2015). Low and intermediate level waste is capable of being stored nearer the surface due to the limited risks  in contrast to the used nuclear fuel (WNA 2015). Storage in stable geological formations in essential, which for example raises a greater challenge for certain countries such as Japan that are unlikely to have geological areas that are stable for long enough periods due to the seismic susceptibility (Normile 2015). Despite the potential threats and concerns there are many established safety standards managed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the European Commission and the Nuclear Energy Agency to name just a few (WNA 2015)! These aid in the formation of national policies and legislation in regards to internationally agreed safety standards. This displays nuclear waste storage to take safety strongly into consideration and therefore the risks may once again by general public exaggerations. However, as seen by Fukushima even if such safety procedures are in place the potential for disaster is still apparent!

Further concerns arise with the transgenerational effect. The radioactive waste management impacts future generations, despite these future popualtions not directly benefiting from the original use (La Porte 1978). Therefore suggesting a socially unjust procedure that is far too short sighted.

However, for all the issues and media exaggerations surrounding the waste, there is evidence to suggest that the issues are perhaps not as great as one would initially suspect. For example nuclear energy produces 200,000m3 low and intermediate waste and 10,000m3 of high level waste annual on a global scale (WNA 2015). This is relatively low when compared to other forms of energy, therefore the singling out of nuclear as being the one energy sector that generates large amounts of waste would be incorrect. Furthermore, unlike other waste products it is seen that the risk diminishes overtime as the radioactive isotopes decay (WNA 2015) – this contrasts fossil fuel CO2 emissions, for example that provides a continually high radiative forcing effect (IPCC 2013). Arguably the threat of climate change is of far greater probability and magnitude on a planetary scale than nuclear – therefore the waste of nuclear surely should be viewed as preferential in contrast the continued climatic warming and ecosystem degradation?

I am not sure eating the nuclear waste is the answer to the storage issue?!

Another point to make is that the claims by Greenpeace and other oppositions that the threats can last millions of years are potentially false. That it may “only” be 1,000 years before the radioactivity decays to a level that is similar to the natural levels in uranium ore within the geology (WNA 2015). The only difference may be that the concentration is higher and therefore would still be seen to provide a greater level of risk than its natural counterpart. This mitigates the longevity of the issue, but 1,000 years is still a vast period of time that will continue to provide a substantial challenge for waste management. This is central to the persistent public fear and negativity towards nuclear waste, based upon imagery of mutations and apparently imaginations of nuclear waste initiating an apocalyptic destruction leading to a rebirth of society (Slovic 1991)?! The contestation and NIMBYism of nuclear waste is therefore likely to limit the locations for storage.

The radioactive decay may reach natural levels within 1,000 years - despite a half life of U-238 for example extending to 4.5 billion years (BBC 2014).

The fears are not solely directed towards health, for example NIMBYism is likely to arise  with evidence to show how house prices dropped greatly with nuclear waste transport routes directed through areas of South Carolina (Gawande 2001). 

Nuclear costs for nuclear energy?

Economic viability is essential within the capitalist society of the modern day – therefore nuclear energy must be capable of fitting within this system. Wider acceptance and more positive support will inevitably arise if it is capable of providing a cheaper source compared to traditional fossils fuels. The amount of money needed for fossil fuel extraction is expanding as the extraction sites are increasingly positioned in complicated environments – along with the quality of the fuel declining (Brook 2014). Fossil fuels are therefore economically on the decline – could nuclear be seen to revitalise the affordable energy market?

The answer to this question is yes – France for example is seen to provide some of the cheapest electric in the world, with 75% of it generated from nuclear sources (Brook 2014). Costs were kept low in construction by utilising structures that were already in place– this can be seen as an answer to the main economic challenge of the construction costs. For example many would argue that the £24 billion+ spent on Hinkley Point C is excessive (Telegraph 2015). However, France has shown with sufficient foresight and planning even the construction costs can be minimalised. For this economic viability to be achieved there needs to be an open market, so that a variety of technologies can be tested rather than subsidies causing the domination of one particular type (Brook 2014). Furthermore long term policies are essential in order for the sustainability to be achieved, whilst the standardisation of plants across the country will enable a unity in terms of equipment and needs. This will therefore prevent additional costs being required for varying or specialised power plant requirements (Brook 2014).

When comparing nuclear to other energy sources it would appear far more attractive to the consumer as it is far less sensitive to fuel cost increases. Therefore, it is far more consistent through economic fluctuations and will provide a more sturdy cost to public electric consumers (Brook 2014). This is exemplified by the stability of low costs in the US for the last 20 years (Figure 1). This stability is based on the evidence that the uranium price increase in the early 21^st century caused only the generation costs to increase - whilst the conversion and fuel fabrication costs (the last stage of turning uranium to nuclear fuel rods) remained stable (WNA 2015).

Figure 1 - Production costs 1995-2012 of different energy sources (World Nuclear Association 2015).

Countering this potential are the severe economic costs that can arise with nuclear disaster – these have been previously noted in regard to the clean-up process in Eastern Europe following Chernobyl and the mass electricity cost increase in Japan as larger proportions of the national supply had to be reverted back to imported fossil fuels!

Further economic concerns are seen with Hinkley Point C and the imbalance in construction costs. These figures will likely be central to many anti-nuclear arguments. The Telegraph (2015) claims that Hinkley Point C may only produce 3.2GW of energy despite costing £24+ billion, compared to the 2GW energy produced from a gas-plant that costs only £1 billion. Clearly the initial costs are far higher – however if looked at over the long term it may be suggested that the savings in terms of fossil fuel extraction and climatic regulation costs may be positive. Nevertheless, it is debated as to whether nuclear energy is economically competitive against the traditional coal and gas (MIT 2012). As the sector develops, with reduced construction time and lessened operating costs then it may gain future competiveness. One particular policy that could push nuclear to the forefront of energy choice is the progression of global carbon credits, or emission taxes (MIT 2012) – the carbon-free uranium source would therefore gain an advantage. It may be seen that there is the need for government subsidies for those organizations that take the first steps of nuclear expansion (MIT 2012). This could provide a wider image of economic possibility, which would stimulate a wider growth. This will be dependable on the governmental and public stance in regard to nuclear energy – which as mentioned in the previous blog is contextually variable.

Artists' impression of Hinkley Point C, issued by EDF (Guardian 2015).

It is claimed by the World Nuclear Association (2015) that nuclear has now become economically competitive – unless it is placed in direct competition with new, low cost stores of fossil fuels. Therefore such competiveness is likely to enhance in the coming years as fossil fuel stores are continually depleted.

Despite a lowered sensitivity to resource costs, nuclear cannot be seen to be immune from cost alterations – especially with the well documented uranium supply questions. Current stores of uranium are thought to be available to provide energy for a further 80 years if current use levels continue (Kidd 2011), greater than the 53 years’ worth of oil known to remain (BP 2014). High costs also exist within the exploration procedure with costs increasing throughout the first decade of the century, with a total of $5.75 billion spent between 2003-2009 (Kidd 2011). If nuclear were to expand however then costs of uranium would need to increase initially – with it believed that if the cost was doubled then this would lead to a 10x increase in economically viable resources (Kidd 2011). This would be based upon increased exploration funds and greater resources reclassified as being economically viable. Therefore costs may have to increase in order for a longer term project to be realistic.

Nuclear energy has been seen to increase with economic growth – however it is a bidirectional relationship in which once the nuclear increases then the economic growth declines (Apergis 2010). It is thought that the economic growth may be hindered by large construction costs as well as the costs related to dealing with the waste which is produced – which will be detailed to a greater degree in a future post. This may suggest therefore that global expansion may not be possible, the extreme costs may mean only rich, developed nations could establish a nuclear network – as poorer nations would not be able to deal with the high costs and slowed economic progression. As mentioned in a previous post, global inequalities in historic fossil fuel use will likely be relocated in nuclear and renewable energy capacities.

The costs attributed to nuclear construction are globally variable, with China seen to have construction costs of $3,500/Kw energy (WorldNuclear Association 2015), this is 1/3 less compared to the EU costs for example. This variance in costs is likely to be attributed to labour costs, experience in the recent construction of reactors and evidence of quicker licensing of projects (World Nuclear Association 2015). It is believed however that over time the Asian cost will stabilise and the EU and US costs will lower to similar levels as greater experience and efficiency is gained.

Uranium has multiple cost benefits compared to fossil fuels such as coal – for example, cheaper transportation costs due to the fact that within the same weight of resource (1kg), uranium can provide 20,000x the amount of energy than coal (World Nuclear Association 2015)! Therefore the energy potential is far greater and less is needed to be transported to supply for the same number of needs – adding onto the benefit of uranium being carbon-free. 10% of the costs per Kw however are attributed to dealing with waste (World Nuclear Association 2015), which is an obvious issue due to the half-life of uranium sources – possible development to recycle waste however may increase the economic viability of nuclear energy.

The Nuclear Energy Institute displayed in 2015 that nuclear had the lowest average costs of electricity for operating facilities, in particular new, more efficient plants had $90/Mwh compared to $100 for coal (World Nuclear Association 2015). It is likely that this cost competiveness will further develop in future years.

Many may fear that the new nuclear plants may have to be publically funded – however evidence of economic profitability may lead to private investment as was seen with EDF and Hinkley Point C. Profitability has been achieved already, for example the “Indian Point Energy Centre” which is located near New York City. It is shown to generate $1.6 billion to the state economy and over $2.5 billion to the nation as a whole (World Nuclear Association 2015). Therefore such profitability is going to be privately engaged with to a greater degree based on the neoliberal desire for accumulation. Add onto this the fact that it generated over 10,000 jobs then it is clear that nuclear energy can be economically positive. Therefore from an economic standpoint alone a wider global expansion is likely to be supported. However, Indian Point was recently shutdown due to a fire in a non-radioactive area of the plant and a mass oil spill to the Hudson River (Guardian 2015). This provides a sobering image, that despite the economic benefits available there will always be the risks, which have the potential to make any economic benefit redundant.

Indian Point Energy Centre (Entergy 2015).

This evidence would suggest that in the long run nuclear energy is economically viable and more attractive than fossil fuels. There are the initial high costs, however the lower transportation costs and the greater energy produced per $ in many examples displays its capacity for expansion. For example in 2011 nuclear energy had the lowest production costs at 2.1c kw/h cost of production, in contrast to gas at 4.51c kw/h (IER 2012). The low and stable cost in the US for example displays its function to provide a desirable option for the wider public and business. Obviously there are the mass economic damages that can arise from post-disaster recoveries. However, if suitable investment is placed into the power plants to ensure safety and efficiency then only positives can be viewed. The stores are limited to provide for around the next 80 years – however with the urgency that is needed to combat climatic change, my opinion is that nuclear should be used now. Harness the high energy capability and reduce emissions, therefore providing time for more politically acceptable sources such as wind and solar to progress to levels where they can take over the energy needs when uranium depletes.

Nuclear disasters and the impact on public support

It is clear that nuclear disasters; in particular Chernobyl and Fukushima, will have large implications on the way in which the public views nuclear energy as a potential renewable energy source. The public support is essential if nuclear expansions are going to become a reality, with strong opposition hindering opportunities (MIT 2012). An example being the Druridge Bay nuclear cancellations (Goodfellow 2011), following mass public protest. It may simply be a need for wider public education (MIT 2012) to allow for people to see past the exaggerations of the media and understand the reality. The current status of my poll displays no one to view nuclear as a risk, this may be a product of an academic audience, emphasising the role of education. Many experts claim that the public exaggerate the risks  (Drottz-Sjoberg 1990), that the level of risk involved will continue to vary between the public and the experts in the field. This incoherence is likely to promote consistant conflicts and a hindrance to nuclear growth.

Protests against nuclear are not an uncommon sight. Source: Indymedia UK

The impacts on public perception are not solely rooted within the areas of the accidents, for example in Germany many voters have come out explicitly opposing nuclear post-Fukushima (Wittneben 2012). There was an increasing demand for the transparency of the sector and its safety – as it was clear from previous disasters that the energy choices could not simply be decided within corporations and governments. The risks were capable of damaging the public, therefore they should be equally involved in decision making. This has led to a strong NIMBYism (not-in-my-backyard) (Wittneben 2012) in Germany and across the world. People maintain negative information and images to a greater extent than the positive – therefore the images of Chernobyl, Fukushima, and the nuclear bomb drop on Hiroshima are likely to remain (Greenberg 2009). The negative images are plastered across the media, with NIMBYism arising from the fact that people do not want to be personally exposed. Therefore, planning the location of nuclear plants will often face mass resistance. Over 50% of the terrestrial land is densely popualted urban areas (Zalasiewicz 2014), therefore the space for uncontested construction will be minimal - consequently mitigating the potential for global nuclear expansion.

The nuclear bomb mushroom cloud at Hiroshima. Source: Nuclear Darkness

Films can also play a strong role in controlling public imaginations - for example the film “Chernobyl Diaries” (see trailer below). A fear of mutated, child monsters is likely to put anyone off supporting nuclear energy in the local area?!

The support however is likely to be contextually variable, with Eurobarometer (2010) surveying 1000s across 27 European countries (Goodfellow 2011).Countries that had nuclear energy systems in place tend to be more positive about the potential. However, it was also suggested that around ¾ of people felt that they did not have enough information on nuclear safety – which can cause the vulnerability to being swayed by media hyperbole. It further highlights the need for greater transparency and wider democratic involvement - such as the inclusion of public risk assessment analysis in nuclear plant construction plans (Goodfellow 2011). Evidence did exist for many countries to have been gaining nuclear support in the 2000s (Goodfellow 2011) – however even in the early post-Fukushima period it was clear such trends began to reverse. For example in Germany progressive support was halted and greater resistance, including the shutting down of multiple power stations, emerged. (Harding 2011).

Further examples of how Chernobyl shifted public perception are seen in Sweden. Pre-Chernobyl the main concern of the public was regarded as being the environment, rather than the direct concerns of nuclear energy (Drottz-Sjoberg 1990). However, as one of the Western European nations to be impacted the most by the radionuclide fallout, Sweden’s viewpoint greatly altered. Not only in terms of social stress, with alcohol sales reported to have received a 10% increase – but also the perceptions of nuclear once again shifted towards stronger negativity (Drottz-Sjoberg 1990). It was seen the greatest fears surrounded health, hope for the future as well as freedom – which may be related to the risks and fears of national security that are often intertwined with nuclear energy. Despite the enhanced negativity there was still an acknowledgement of the economic benefits nuclear can provide, including stable electricity costs (examined in next blog) – therefore many nations face a trade-off dilemma between the obvious risks and the realisation of the positive implications also (Drottz-Sjoberg 1990).

Nuclear support may arise when framed as cheap electricity or a mitigator of climate change. 

            Many opposition political parties looked to capitalise upon the scepticism towards nuclear following Chernobyl, with promises to remove nuclear energy plans in West Germany and the UK being reported (Renn 1990). With the Dutch government altering policy to delay plans for nuclear reactors until the Chernobyl accident had been fully evaluated (Renn 1990) – therefore this displayed the initial impact upon opinion to impact the governments as well as the wider public. State action was paramount due to nuclear fear becoming a reality with the Chernobyl events, Germany for example introduced the Federal Ministry for Environment and Reactor Safety (Renn 1990) – as mentioned Chernobyl sent global shockwaves which promoted many to attempt to initiate a new safety culture within nuclear energy (Meshkati 2007). The fear is arguably contextually variable, with those nations in closer proximity to Chernobyl having greater opposition. For example USA was hardly impacted and therefore saw only minimal declines in support (Besley 2014), with distant countries often having an attitude that such disasters can not impact their country (Poortinga 2013). Limited deterioration in support was especially seen in countries that were highly developed, or those that had initial high nuclear support. Those countries may experience the “inoculation effect”, in that their opinion is so strong that they feel immune to the risks others experience (McGuire 1985 in Renn 1990). This is likely to contrast Europe with its national proximity and high nuclear density, meaning it is far more susceptible to risks from outside the national boarders (Kim 2014) – compared to the relative isolation of USA.

              Furthermore the impacts on public support may not necessarily be permanent, Finnish support had regained momentum a year on from the disaster for example (Renn 1990). However, certain negative images remain, the association of nuclear energy to bombs and mutations is arguably unavoidable and will continue to prevent wide scale acceptance from being achieved – in my opinion! Renn (1990) claims the media depictions within Europe were relatively accurate and did not add to the confusion surrounding health risks – however if you look at this BBC report on Fukushima for example (2^nd video on the page), then the clear emotive imagery and language used (such as “dead zone” and “forced to flee”) displays the media to drive a predominantly negative image on nuclear energy.

Some nations, such as Japan, may have continual low support based upon reoccurring nuclear incidents throughout the 1990s (Cyranoski 2010). Fukushima lowered support to a greater extent, causing a decline in the public perception of nuclear as a climate change mitigator as the immediate risks to health raced to the forefront of many people’s minds (Poortinga 2013). Britain differs from Japan, as it is defined as displaying a "reluctant acceptance" rather than a firm opposition (Poortinga 2013). This may display a growing acceptance following Chernobyl, with greater transparency and technology available, then a certain level of support is capable of being regained. The lack of direct impact from previous disasters is likely to have caused this differential standpoint. However, what is agreed upon in both nations is that nuclear should not be a renewable priority, that other options should be attempted initially (Poortinga 2013). This therefore displays the "hostility hangover" of nuclear disasters to exist, even within places of general support. Wind or solar for example would always be favoured due to the less publicised risks.

It is clear that the literature provides variable views as to the impact of nuclear disasters on public perception in time and space. However, what is generally accepted is the fact that it does not appear to have totally ended the possibility for a nuclear future (Taebi 2015). Opposition will always exist, however expert knowledge and the infrequency of events is likely to maintain nuclear as a viable future option in many nations that have the funds and capabilities to construct such power plants. This is likely to be attributed to a larger global acknowledgement of the risks of climate change, which when nuclear is framed as a carbon-free mitigator a greater level of positivity is generated, as seen within the quantitative study of the UK (Pidgeon 2008). The growing fear of climate change is seen to be influential in the initiation of the “nuclear renaissance” (Goodfellow 2011).

               
              Not all responses are negative – for example Chernobyl has emerged as perhaps one of the strangest touristic attractions (Telegraph 2011). With radiation levels nearing normality much is invested to bring global tourism to the area. This provides a contrasting public opinion of curiosity and intrigue. This is unlikely to impact global energy policies however it does display how public perception cannot be generalised and that variety will exist.

Chernobyl tourism - visiting the apocalypse? Source: Chernobyl Tour

Fukushima 2011 - lessons were not learnt?

         The Fukushima accident was a result of a 9.0 magnitude earthquake that struck off the Eastern coast of Japan (World Nuclear Association 2015) – however it was the tsunami, that was reported to have reached 21m in height offshore and at least 12m on the point of coastal impact (Asahi Shimbun 2012), that was the main causation of the accident. The nuclear reactors on the shore were relatively resistant to the seismic action but the tsunami impact was arguably less prepared for – this was despite academic papers being produced that claimed such tsunamis were possible (Suzuki 2013 – BBC interview). The issue emerged from the Fukushima Daiichi units 1-3, where the tsunami impact caused the reactor cooling and water circulation functions to fail (World Nuclear Association 2015). This consequently led to the emergence of high pressure conditions and high-pressure hydrogen explosions (Fukurai 2012). Previous precautions had placed the seawater cooling pumps 5m above sea-level. However such precautions were made redundant by the vast magnitude of the tsunami waves that impacted the nuclear plant.

Tsunami wave height. Source: Asahi Shimbun 2012

Similar to Chernobyl there was a mass release of radionuclide material including Iodine and Caesium 134, 136 and 137 (Fukada 2013). Therefore the fear of similar health conditions such as thyroid cancer, mutations and mental illnesses were apparent. These concerns were central to the Fukushima evacuation policy – relocating people from a 20-30km radius of the nuclear reactor (FOTG 2015), with restricted access only permitted to the emergency services. This highlights another nuclear energy concern in regards to the social impacts and personal psychological stress of being removed from your home. This concern was not simply a brief issue, with evidence showing around 120,000 people were still living within “nuclear limbo” three years after the accident (Guardian 2014). Around half of the evacuees surveyed were seen to be living away from families, with a reported 68% of families claimed to have been suffering from psychosocial or physical stress (Guardian 2014). This extends the issues of nuclear beyond the publicised illnesses and deaths to the wider reaching social impacts.

Explosion of the nuclear reactors. Source: Beforeitsnews.com

However, what must be noted is that despite 19,000 deaths being caused by the tsunami devastation, no deaths have yet to be recorded from nuclear based radiation (Guardian 2011). This therefore may suggest that the risks involved are minor, that lessons had been learnt from the Chernobyl disaster. This may in part be due to the quicker and more efficient Japanese response, with evacuation of the area as mentioned – along with the circulation of potassium iodide tablets in the impacted areas (Butler 2011). These tablets insert nonradioactive iodine to the thyroid gland, which acts to prevent the cancerous threat, which is seen to be of particular concern within children (Butler 2011). However, can the safety success  be truly evaluated within such a short time period following the event? Other reports from the Nordic Probabilistic Safety Assessment claim that the disaster will cause around 600,000 premature deaths (Cazzoli 2011), based on future cancerous growths and still-born pregnancies. Such health risks are likely to arise from radioactive consumption, as radionuclide fallout contaminates vegetables for example, as well as  marine fish catches (Buesseler 2011). Therefore the apparent celebration many have in regard to the immediate safety may turn to mourning as the long term impacts become increasingly visible.

Radioactive fish?! Source: Simpsons Wiki

It is seen that just like Chernobyl, certain safety changes were stimulated following the disaster. Most notably the requirement to take into account the "worse case scenario" when planning on the level above sea level that nuclear reactors and cooling systems  are built. This is likely to induce higher costs for future nuclear plants - which along with declining global support - may limit nuclear energy production to restricted regions of the globe (MIT 2012). There is a need for the safety criteria to be further unified by global regulations, to ensure that the positives of a carbon-free fuel are not dismissed due to highly isolated incidents (MIT 2012).

Economic concerns were also paramount as was the case for Chernobyl too, for example the fact that Japan imports around 90% of its energy now following the nuclear downturn places enhanced economic stress upon the nation (BBC 2014). The increased need to import fuel has led to an increase of 10 trillion Yen in costs (Devalier 2014 – BBC interview). This has consequently had wider reaching impacts with electricity costs increasing for the Japanese population – depicting the scope of impact once again. Furthermore, Japan is now the 2^nd largest importer of coal and the 3^rd largest for oil on a global scale (Devalier 2014); this supports the belief that with a loss of nuclear it appears to be the common practice to fall back on fossil fuels (Guardian 2011). This therefore counters any climatic emission progressions that had been made and further adds to the growing concerns of the environment. Further economic issues relate to local economies with the evacuations causing business loss as well as agricultural declines (Yasunari 2011), with large scale excavations of radioactive topsoil (BBC 2013). The local town of Miyagi for example had much land nearing or exceeding the Cs-137 limits allowed under Food Sanitation Laws (Yasunari 2011).

Fukushima evacuation zone. Source: BBC 2011

Fukushima was a result of a natural disaster, therefore can the accident that revolved around the nuclear plant truly be utilised as a case study to oppose nuclear energy. I believe it can, the complacency of the government cannot be underestimated, dismissing research papers that highlighted the tsunami potential and the inadequate planning by placing such a volatile and dangerous factory in a seismic zone cannot be ignored. Therefore it can be defined as a human disaster which caused socioeconomic, environmental and health damage. The fear that emerges is that Japan has the third highest GDP in the world (World Bank 2014), it has the funds and the potential to take every safety precaution available. However, the fact that such a developed nation faced such a disaster means the potential for it to occur in countries with less funding and with less expertise is frightful. After Chernobyl important lessons were learnt, yet arguably it was not enough!

Many would argue that the high magnitude tsunami event is highly infrequent and therefore it was perhaps perceived that such precautions were not needed to be taken within the lifetime of the Fukushima plant – however the possible negative outcomes can be globally devastating and therefore I would think that the greatest level of precaution should be taken for the worst possible scenario in all instances.

The lack of preparation here surprises me, especially following the hysteria surrounding Chernobyl – I still believe nuclear to be a strong candidate for future expansion, but it is clear it must continue to be taken more seriously and such complacencies and errors simply cannot be replicated.

                

            Understandably the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters had major impacts on public support and the perceptions and symbols attached to nuclear energy – these will be explored in the next blog and the manner in which this may hinder the potential expansion of nuclear energy.

             At the time of writing this post, none of the 11 votes in my poll have proclaimed a fear of nuclear as a threat or unnecessary risk. This is surprising, however it many be related to the audience of the blog - with the wider public likely to possess varied responses.

Chernobyl - a case study of the risks involved

To many, including myself, the first thoughts that come to mind when talking about nuclear are catastrophic accidents – most iconically the accident at reactor 4 Chernobyl on 26^th April 1986 (Dubrova 1996). Here I will introduce the cause of the issues and the detrimental outcomes of the horrific accident. This will be followed by an examination of the more recent Fukushima incident in 2011 – with this information I will then examine the implications that such disasters had upon public perception and support, as public backing is viewed as essential for nuclear power expansion possibilities (MIT 2015).

Source: Behind Closed Doors 2014

             The disaster was driven by both poor design as well as human error (NEI 2011), with irregular nuclear rod designs being central to the destructive power surge that followed (World Nuclear Association 2015). Adding to this was the fact that the personnel who were testing the turbines at a lower energy level were not adequately trained – that when testing as to whether the new voltage regulators functioned at a lower level of turbine power, they failed to acknowledge the consequences of allowing the power to rapidly decline and the instability of the system that would follow (World Nuclear Association 2015). Following the power surge the fuel was heated to extremely high temperatures, which in contrast to the cooling water that was being added via the cooling pipes, but also due to the rupturing of the cooling system, generated extreme high pressure conditions (NEI 2011). The 1000t cover plate of the reactor dislodged and exploded causing fission and radioactive particles to enter the atmosphere, whilst a second explosion was seen to blast hot graphite and fragments of the fuel pipes also (World Nuclear Association 2015).

                

             Human life was drastically impacted by the disaster, not only in regards to health, but it also had vast implications upon government support, psychological fear of risk and the perception of nuclear energy in general. The physical damage cannot be overlooked, yet with high uncertainty as to the deaths caused, the true magnitude is relatively unknown (Guardian 2010). The UN World Health Organisation reports that only 56 deaths have been caused from the radioactive exposure – yet in the long run such health issues will cause a total of 4,000 people to succumb to the Chernobyl impacts (Guardian 2010) This contrasts another UN sector, the International Research Centre on Cancer, which predicts a much larger death toll of 16,000 directly related deaths. Most worryingly the Ukrainian national commission for radiation claims 0.5 million deaths were a result (Guardian 2010)! Arguably the numbers are irrelevant when put into perspective, the risk of death itself is enough for many to oppose nuclear. 

               

              Death is not always immediate which therefore causes the level of uncertainty, the long lasting impacts upon the surrounding area’s health further displays the risks involved. Unlike a coal mine collapsing and causing immediate loss of life, nuclear can continue to take lives for decades to come. Mutations were recorded as a response to the radionuclide exposure, evidence displays a doubling in the mutation rate within the children born from exposed parents (Dubrova 1996) – it was seen to correlate with the level of Cs-137 exposure, an artificial radionuclide only injected to the atmosphere via nuclear bomb testing and the Chernobyl disaster (Bunzl 1989). Such mutations of the chromosomes are often related to further health challenges such as mental illness (Greenpeace 2006).

Evidence shows that exposure to Cs-137 can have a variety of major health implications, including reducing blood cell counts which has been shown to lead to death within a matter of weeks in other exposed species (ATSDR 2015). In regard to reproductive concerns then there has been evidence to display higher male infertility in the affected areas – alongside a greater % of disrupted births within women (Greenpeace 2006). Greenpeace strongly opposes nuclear energy, as will be delved into greater in a future blog, therefore they tend to utilise Chernobyl at the forefront of their arguments, even if in reality it was a freak accident that cannot truly be representative of the energy sector as a whole.

It would be wrong to suggest that the Chernobyl incident was an isolated occurrence, with radionuclide fallout from the atmosphere (Hilton 1992) being a global occurrence – with particularly high fallout exposure in the surrounding areas of Belarus, northern Ukraine and Russia (Williams 2006). This therefore raises the concern of global responsibility; can decisions on major nuclear energy expansions be made internally within a nation if the consequences are global? Arguably the impact of fossil fuel combustion faces similar concerns of global inequality. Low-emission nations often face the larger negative impacts of climate change based on their dependency to local natural resources and a lack of capital to fund adaptable processes and technologies (Sherr 2000). A shift to nuclear energy may therefore fail to correct global energy inequalities, in regards to the risks involved but also the economic ability for many nations to undertake nuclear projects with exponentially high construction costs often associated. An example being the Hinkley Point C project in Somerset which is estimated to cost a total of £25 billion+ once completed (Telegraph 2015).

Cancer was a major detrimental outcome, in particular cancer of the thyroid gland driven by exposure to Idione-131 which is another example of a radioisotope released into the atmosphere through the No. 4 reactor explosion (Williams 2006). The Iodine uptake to the thyroid gland was driven through the consumption of local produce such as milk that had become concentrated with the radionuclide (WHO 2006). This consequently triggered DNA breaks, mutations and tumour growth (Williams 2006), which explains as to why the death toll and safety success of a nuclear disaster cannot be taken within the immediate time frame due to the longer lasting causes of death. I could spend my entire set of blog posts talking about the health risks that have emerged from the Chernobyl disaster – however I want to provide a more representative account of nuclear energy as a whole.

An isolated focus on the direct health issues however would undermine the full extent of the damage caused by Chernobyl. Firstly, the economic costs of the disaster and the clean-up procedure were exponential, with Ukraine still spending between 5-7% of government budget every year towards Chernobyl related programmes (The Chernobyl Forum 2005). With Belarus also receiving a large proportion of economic pressure with estimates of spending $13 billion between 1991-2003. The economic impacts were not only viewed on a governmental scale, but also seen within the local economy with the agricultural sector majorly impacted. 784,320 hectares of land were removed from the three nations of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia due to the fear of contaminated land and products (The Chernobyl Forum 2005) – which as mentioned were major health risks in the early stages, where suitable information was not provided to the public quickly enough. Add onto this the social impacts of fear and anxiety from exaggerated health risks and the depression of unemployment – it was clear the overall social well-being declined vastly (The Chernobyl Forum 2005). This can be supported by evidence of increased heart disease, alcoholism and suicide in Belarus (The Guardian 2004) – highlighting the full social, health and economic risks that are apparent within nuclear energy.

I have started with this low-point as to me this is how nuclear energy has always been portrayed –such images as those below reflect the media depictions. I argue however that this one example cannot be utilised in isolation as a central case study for nuclear resistance – the evidence is clear that the safety in terms of personnel and the structure were not suitable, that the range and extent of the disaster is unique. It could even be said that the Chernobyl disaster was positive in the long run for nuclear energy as it opened the eyes of many to the need for improved safety requirements. Since the disaster the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has been central to driving new safety standards and requirements within the nuclear energy sector – including the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Source (ILO 2006). 

       

Photo by Thomas Szlukoveny - Source: Slate Magazine

Photo by Iain Bolton - Source: Huffington Post

   There was also a severe lack of health and safety management in the Chernobyl reactor which provided another important lesson as to the requirement for the education of staff to ensure such errors were not made again (ILO 2006). Further evidence of the Chernobyl incident being central to the improvements within the sector is seen through the enhanced role taken by the International Atomic Energy Agency (World Nuclear Association 2015). Following the incident safety procedures were more stringently applied, with even minor concerns required to be reported. Additionally, every country with nuclear energy must have a safety inspector to oversee proceedings and to ensure management; training and personnel are working within the safety procedures and standards. It is seen that the disaster has taught humanity an important lesson and has ushered in a new safety culture within the nuclear energy sector (Meshkati 2007).

               These changes have been influential in nuclear being regarded as one of the safest energy resources, particularly if you view it in terms of mortality (Brook 2014, table below) – (however this is dependable on the death toll that is accounted for by Chernobyl). Many deaths via cancer occur on a global scale and therefore there is great difficulty in being able to attach the full blame to radiation. 

Source: Brook 2014

“But energy is like medicine: if there are no side-effects, the chances are that it doesn't work” (Guardian 2011).

All energy sources have side effects; whether it is climate change or the noise and ugliness of wind turbines (I personally think they look rather good!). Arguably, the magnitude of possible negative effects involved in nuclear are far greater than being an eye-sore, however the vast safety measures now in place have reduced the probability drastically. The risks of climate change are becoming ever more urgent – it would be wrong to act with such short-sightedness to disregard nuclear as such a high risk that it should not be pursued to an extent. My opinion at this stage would for it to be used as a background generator alongside other renewable resources, as nuclear can continually produce energy when solar and wind for example cannot. If there was a far greater implementation on a global scale, then by the very sense that there would be increased numbers of nuclear reactors the chance for a disaster would also increase – therefore limiting the expansion would be my suggestion at this period of my research.

Thank you for reading!