Nuclear disasters and the impact on public support

It is clear that nuclear disasters; in particular Chernobyl and Fukushima, will have large implications on the way in which the public views nuclear energy as a potential renewable energy source. The public support is essential if nuclear expansions are going to become a reality, with strong opposition hindering opportunities (MIT 2012). An example being the Druridge Bay nuclear cancellations (Goodfellow 2011), following mass public protest. It may simply be a need for wider public education (MIT 2012) to allow for people to see past the exaggerations of the media and understand the reality. The current status of my poll displays no one to view nuclear as a risk, this may be a product of an academic audience, emphasising the role of education. Many experts claim that the public exaggerate the risks  (Drottz-Sjoberg 1990), that the level of risk involved will continue to vary between the public and the experts in the field. This incoherence is likely to promote consistant conflicts and a hindrance to nuclear growth.

Protests against nuclear are not an uncommon sight. Source: Indymedia UK

The impacts on public perception are not solely rooted within the areas of the accidents, for example in Germany many voters have come out explicitly opposing nuclear post-Fukushima (Wittneben 2012). There was an increasing demand for the transparency of the sector and its safety – as it was clear from previous disasters that the energy choices could not simply be decided within corporations and governments. The risks were capable of damaging the public, therefore they should be equally involved in decision making. This has led to a strong NIMBYism (not-in-my-backyard) (Wittneben 2012) in Germany and across the world. People maintain negative information and images to a greater extent than the positive – therefore the images of Chernobyl, Fukushima, and the nuclear bomb drop on Hiroshima are likely to remain (Greenberg 2009). The negative images are plastered across the media, with NIMBYism arising from the fact that people do not want to be personally exposed. Therefore, planning the location of nuclear plants will often face mass resistance. Over 50% of the terrestrial land is densely popualted urban areas (Zalasiewicz 2014), therefore the space for uncontested construction will be minimal - consequently mitigating the potential for global nuclear expansion.

The nuclear bomb mushroom cloud at Hiroshima. Source: Nuclear Darkness

Films can also play a strong role in controlling public imaginations - for example the film “Chernobyl Diaries” (see trailer below). A fear of mutated, child monsters is likely to put anyone off supporting nuclear energy in the local area?!

The support however is likely to be contextually variable, with Eurobarometer (2010) surveying 1000s across 27 European countries (Goodfellow 2011).Countries that had nuclear energy systems in place tend to be more positive about the potential. However, it was also suggested that around ¾ of people felt that they did not have enough information on nuclear safety – which can cause the vulnerability to being swayed by media hyperbole. It further highlights the need for greater transparency and wider democratic involvement - such as the inclusion of public risk assessment analysis in nuclear plant construction plans (Goodfellow 2011). Evidence did exist for many countries to have been gaining nuclear support in the 2000s (Goodfellow 2011) – however even in the early post-Fukushima period it was clear such trends began to reverse. For example in Germany progressive support was halted and greater resistance, including the shutting down of multiple power stations, emerged. (Harding 2011).

Further examples of how Chernobyl shifted public perception are seen in Sweden. Pre-Chernobyl the main concern of the public was regarded as being the environment, rather than the direct concerns of nuclear energy (Drottz-Sjoberg 1990). However, as one of the Western European nations to be impacted the most by the radionuclide fallout, Sweden’s viewpoint greatly altered. Not only in terms of social stress, with alcohol sales reported to have received a 10% increase – but also the perceptions of nuclear once again shifted towards stronger negativity (Drottz-Sjoberg 1990). It was seen the greatest fears surrounded health, hope for the future as well as freedom – which may be related to the risks and fears of national security that are often intertwined with nuclear energy. Despite the enhanced negativity there was still an acknowledgement of the economic benefits nuclear can provide, including stable electricity costs (examined in next blog) – therefore many nations face a trade-off dilemma between the obvious risks and the realisation of the positive implications also (Drottz-Sjoberg 1990).

Nuclear support may arise when framed as cheap electricity or a mitigator of climate change. 

            Many opposition political parties looked to capitalise upon the scepticism towards nuclear following Chernobyl, with promises to remove nuclear energy plans in West Germany and the UK being reported (Renn 1990). With the Dutch government altering policy to delay plans for nuclear reactors until the Chernobyl accident had been fully evaluated (Renn 1990) – therefore this displayed the initial impact upon opinion to impact the governments as well as the wider public. State action was paramount due to nuclear fear becoming a reality with the Chernobyl events, Germany for example introduced the Federal Ministry for Environment and Reactor Safety (Renn 1990) – as mentioned Chernobyl sent global shockwaves which promoted many to attempt to initiate a new safety culture within nuclear energy (Meshkati 2007). The fear is arguably contextually variable, with those nations in closer proximity to Chernobyl having greater opposition. For example USA was hardly impacted and therefore saw only minimal declines in support (Besley 2014), with distant countries often having an attitude that such disasters can not impact their country (Poortinga 2013). Limited deterioration in support was especially seen in countries that were highly developed, or those that had initial high nuclear support. Those countries may experience the “inoculation effect”, in that their opinion is so strong that they feel immune to the risks others experience (McGuire 1985 in Renn 1990). This is likely to contrast Europe with its national proximity and high nuclear density, meaning it is far more susceptible to risks from outside the national boarders (Kim 2014) – compared to the relative isolation of USA.

              Furthermore the impacts on public support may not necessarily be permanent, Finnish support had regained momentum a year on from the disaster for example (Renn 1990). However, certain negative images remain, the association of nuclear energy to bombs and mutations is arguably unavoidable and will continue to prevent wide scale acceptance from being achieved – in my opinion! Renn (1990) claims the media depictions within Europe were relatively accurate and did not add to the confusion surrounding health risks – however if you look at this BBC report on Fukushima for example (2^nd video on the page), then the clear emotive imagery and language used (such as “dead zone” and “forced to flee”) displays the media to drive a predominantly negative image on nuclear energy.

Some nations, such as Japan, may have continual low support based upon reoccurring nuclear incidents throughout the 1990s (Cyranoski 2010). Fukushima lowered support to a greater extent, causing a decline in the public perception of nuclear as a climate change mitigator as the immediate risks to health raced to the forefront of many people’s minds (Poortinga 2013). Britain differs from Japan, as it is defined as displaying a "reluctant acceptance" rather than a firm opposition (Poortinga 2013). This may display a growing acceptance following Chernobyl, with greater transparency and technology available, then a certain level of support is capable of being regained. The lack of direct impact from previous disasters is likely to have caused this differential standpoint. However, what is agreed upon in both nations is that nuclear should not be a renewable priority, that other options should be attempted initially (Poortinga 2013). This therefore displays the "hostility hangover" of nuclear disasters to exist, even within places of general support. Wind or solar for example would always be favoured due to the less publicised risks.

It is clear that the literature provides variable views as to the impact of nuclear disasters on public perception in time and space. However, what is generally accepted is the fact that it does not appear to have totally ended the possibility for a nuclear future (Taebi 2015). Opposition will always exist, however expert knowledge and the infrequency of events is likely to maintain nuclear as a viable future option in many nations that have the funds and capabilities to construct such power plants. This is likely to be attributed to a larger global acknowledgement of the risks of climate change, which when nuclear is framed as a carbon-free mitigator a greater level of positivity is generated, as seen within the quantitative study of the UK (Pidgeon 2008). The growing fear of climate change is seen to be influential in the initiation of the “nuclear renaissance” (Goodfellow 2011).

               
              Not all responses are negative – for example Chernobyl has emerged as perhaps one of the strangest touristic attractions (Telegraph 2011). With radiation levels nearing normality much is invested to bring global tourism to the area. This provides a contrasting public opinion of curiosity and intrigue. This is unlikely to impact global energy policies however it does display how public perception cannot be generalised and that variety will exist.

Chernobyl tourism - visiting the apocalypse? Source: Chernobyl Tour