Nuclear Terrorism and Greenpeace Discussion

Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons are inseparable in the minds of much of the opposition (Mirel 2009). It is likely the connection will continue to play a role in public considerations with the media depictions. From personal experience of watching the news often nuclear energy potential is commonly associated with a risk of weaponry. This fear is likely to increase with the proliferation of nuclear potential around the globe (MIT 2015), as technologies capable of separating weapons-usable plutonium and uranium become widely available then the potential for security threats increases in scope.

Map of nuclear potential on a global scale - increasing scope. Key: Yellow = under construction. Blue = planned. Orange = not operating. Green = operating. Red = shut down (Clark 2012).

As was previously mentioned President Jimmy Carter abandoned waste reprocessing plans after a nuclear weapon test in India in 1974 used plutonium from a research reactor (Gerrard 2015). The fear was that the processed material could be susceptible to theft and therefore used in nuclear weapons – consequently jeopardising US security. Therefore permanent waste storage was favoured to limit the threat (Forbes 2015). Such concerns have enhanced following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and therefore a shift to reprocessing policies is unlikely to occur, despite the potential for carbon-free energy. Not only is there a fear of weaponry, but also the concern that nuclear power stations could be targeted by terrorist attacks, due to the potential civil damage they can cause – illustrated from past case studies (WNA 2015). In the US the robust concrete structures are deemed to be able to withstand aircraft impact, with bulletproof security stations also implanted in many stations to internally protect the nuclear safety also (WNA 2015).

The dual use of nuclear for energy/research and weapon creation creates the difficulty in combating the concern (NEIS 2004). IAEA inspections are undertaken in order to assess the use of nuclear energy and to assure that they are not being misused for weapons (IAEA 2001). However, the fact nuclear can be used for peaceful purposes also means the identification of misuse may not be straight forward – immoral use may be veiled under an image of emission-reducing objectives. Add onto this the fact that countries can simply leave the agreement or not sign it (Higgin 2006), meaning the deterrent to weaponry is not substantial. There is also the contradiction within this process, with the UK, USA, China, France and Russia permitted to hold weapons (IAEA 2001) – displaying a global disparity in the rules. Perhaps highlighting how Western (and Chinese) weaponry is thought of as essential for peace and protection – compared to other nations possessing it for terrorism. Is the difference really there?!

Royal Navy's nuclear submarine - HMS Vanguard (BBC 2015).

I argue however that climate change is a far greater threat to national security than nuclear power – many may disagree with this statement (feel free to comment below). Nuclear should not be scrapped as it provides a potential security threat, as a far larger magnitude threat of climatic change is ever quickly approaching. That is why I find it strange that Greenpeace (2006), continually oppose nuclear expansions – yet a central objective of the organisation is to “stop climate change”. They list multiple issues from waste to terrorism – whilst claiming even optimistic nuclear reactor builds would be insufficient to stop climate change. However, as was seen in the future trends post rapid production is possible. I oppose to the fact that they put so much effort into opposing nuclear – failing to realise the potential it has – surely expanding even a small amount and cutting emissions is better than nothing! Surely their resources would be better used attacking the fossil fuel sector rather than nuclear?! The urgency of the climatic issue means all should be done to stop the increased atmospheric CO2 composition, nuclear has a quick start up time and can limit the magnitude – it surely has to at least be acknowledged as one of many options!

Greenpeace (2015) claim one of their targets to be "Make sure emissions peak in 2015 and decrease as rapidly as possible towards 0 after that". Surely if an objective is to achieve a speedy recovery, then all alternatives have to be engaged with at this time of proposed urgency. It is not a time to pick and choose!

Is nuclear not one of the ways to achieve the clean future? (Greenpeace 2015).

As the blog has progressed I feel my opinion swaying towards a pro-nuclear position. Before starting this blog I knew very little about the nuclear sector and therefore my opinion may simply be a product of the literature and media I have engaged with (despite trying to encounter an unbiased selection)! The threats are real and more often than not can be large – however with regulations and improved technologies it surely has to be accepted as an important energy source. Whether it expands to become the dominant global provider is another question, with many, including myself seeing large scale wind or solar as a more desirable option. However, in this period of urgency it must be utilised – stopping it all together as Greenpeace suggests is counter-productive to their organisation objectives and global desires to cut emissions and limit the magnitude of climatic damage! 

Hinkley Point C - Part 2

The GMB Union’s national secretary Gary Smith, directly opposed the claims of Amber Rudd and the positivity that Point C and the further Sussex and Essex nuclear plans would provide. He argues against the openness and strong desire for Chinese capital – claiming it was simply a push to prevent the conservatives from having debt on their balance sheets (Macalister 2015).  Furthermore, the influx of Chinese equipment and contracts will mitigate the British economic potential, despite claims that 60% of contracts will be open to UK companies, the reality is the higher costs compared to the Chinese will mitigate the benefit. Additionally Smith states (Macalister 2015), that the influx of Chinese technology may place safety at risk, especially following the claims of He Zuoxiu, a leading Chinese scientist, that China has not invested significantly in safety controls in the nuclear sector (Graham-Harrison 2015). The Post-Fukushima reactor ban has been removed but safety has not improved, for example many Chinese reactors are planned in densely populated areas where there is a water supply for reactor cooling – potentially placing millions at risk (Graham-Harrison 2015). UK safety regulations will be applied, therefore mitigating the risk – yet the technology may not be available to a sufficient standard from the Chinese source.

Another concern (Macalister 2015) is the security issue of permitting the Chinese to enter the British nuclear programme – threats to national security and the possibility of atomic warfare are continually associated with the nuclear sector. This is often a strong argument of the opposition and will be examined in a future blog post!

With this many campaigns have arisen opposing the Hinkley Point C project such as Stop Hinkley. The group wrote to the UK government, highlighting the recent Chinse chemical explosions, the continually weak health and safety record and the scandalously poor human rights as being central reasons as to why the UK-China partnership should be scrapped (Stop Hinkley 2015). The two sides of the story provide very different evaluations, from British job creation to Chinese technology putting the UK public at risk.

Logo for the Stop Hinkley campaign (Stop Hinkley 2015).

A high profile opposition campaign comes from the Austrian Government (WNA 2015), this is despite Europe having around 27% of the energy produced by nuclear sources. The dominant argument from Austria is that it desires a nuclear-free Europe, with claims that nuclear is far more expensive and environmentally damaging than alternate sources such as wind and solar. However, if nuclear was removed then the Europe’s emission reductions would be dismal, due to other sources lacking behind the current nuclear capacity. The IPCC (2007) has recently confirmed the nuclear potential in reducing global emissions, along with the fact that nuclear can provide continual energy compared to the temporal variability of wind for example (WNA2015). Therefore I would argue that the complete dismissal of nuclear by the Austrian government would hinder climate change targets and detriment European energy security. The campaign has reached a stage of potential legal action from Austria and potentially Luxembourg also (Nelsen 2015), particularly over the EU Commission allowing state aid and the impact that has on the energy market. Such lawsuits are likely to cause delays and disruptions to the Hinkley construction! The opposition from Austria is not surprising with a long history of nuclear abstinence, with evidence of prolonged disputes with the bordering Czech Republic over previous plants and proposed future constructions (Černoch2015).

Anti-nuclear demonstration in Vienna, Austria 2011 - to mark the 25th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster (Cryptome 2011).

Despite the fears of poor Chinese health and safety, there is evidence to suggest the power station design has learnt from previous mistakes – in particular the Fukushima disaster (Raby 2015). EDF claims that all possible sea level threats, from climate change, storms, tides and tsunamis are accounted for in the sea wall defence. The site is positioned in excess of 14m above the sea level, which gives leeway to the possible increases that may be experienced in the 60 year life span (Raby 2015). Therefore, protection from the pressure-based explosions seen in Fukushima is provided through precautious planning.

Proposed sea wall at Hinkley Point C (Raby 2015).

The UK governmental assistance to the private nuclear investors in the guaranteed pricing etc. was promoted by the European Commission, despite fears that it would disturb and damage the free energy market (Černoch 2015). With this confirmation of state assistance being a legal procedure in the energy sector, Point C could be viewed as a catalyst for similar projects to expand around the EU. Obviously not all countries will have the funds available to subsidies and assist a nuclear expansion, meaning there may be a disbalance in potential between Western and Central/Eastern Europe. However, it is not impossible that such countries as Czech Republic may exploit the European Commission ruling to stimulate private investment and increased nuclear capacity (Černoch 2015). Hinkley Point C may therefore be central to stimulating an expanded nuclear future within Europe.

Hinkey Point C - Part 1

Hinkley Point C - Projected construction (Greenpeace 2015).

As mentioned in the previous posts, the future of a nuclear expansion is likely to be rooted within global alliances. Hinkley Point C in Somerset is being constructed under such an alliance with a 65.5% EDF share and 33.5% with the state owned China General Nuclear Corporation (EDF 2015). Further alliances are expected with EDF suggesting they are aiming to sell more shares in the nuclear plant construction (EDF 2015). The two current shareholders have also expressed plans for further joint projects in Essex and Suffolk, illustrating the long term, joint commitments to nuclear expansions within the UK. The Energy Secretary, Amber Rudd was quick to highlight the positives of this deal, with the ability for the power station to power 6 million homes and to provide in excess of 25,000 new jobs, boosting both financial and energy security.

The partnership is not new, with EDF and GCN collaborating for decades (EDF 2015),  the experience both companies have had in nuclear expansions, especially in France – will benefit the UK programme greatly. Allowing the growth of a modern, safe and efficient nuclear sector. Many may fear that the benefits will be experienced outside of national boarders; however it has been ensured that the majority of the service contracts will be opened to British companies allowing for British economic expansion and job creation to be a secondary benefit.

EDF and GCN sign Strategic Investment Agreement (EDF 2015).

The reactor is planned to be completed by 2025, with costs claimed to be $18 billion (EDF 2015), yet other reports (Gosden 2015) suggesting costs in excess of $24 billion. These exponential costs require sureties, which is why there is a guaranteed electricity price - £89.50/Mwh for the first 35 years - which the investors will receive. The cost is going to be greater than current fossil fuel costs, yet competitive in the renewable market (EDF 2015). It must also be realised that despite the vast construction costs, the public are not paying – with the construction costs totally covered by the private sector. Therefore the public only pay when they are receiving the electricity, which may mitigate opposition to the power station and the astronomical costs.

Point C will provide 7% of the country’s electricity generating needs (EDF 2015), a significant proportion from a single station. Along with the electricity and employment potential, the environmental benefits must also be noted, with the zero-carbon production central to the drive for a greater nuclear future. It is predicted that Point C will prevent 600 million tonnes of CO2 from entering the atmosphere, over its 60 year life span (EDF 2015). Allowing climatic forcing to be reduced and particulate matter risks to be mitigated (Yim 2012). Continued nuclear expansions, as have been planned, will be influential in meeting emission targets in the UK, with a desired 80% reduction on 1990 levels by 2050 (CCC 2008). This level of reduction will enable the 2C global temperature increase threshold to be maintained, or breached to the minimal amount. Further information on climate change targets can be found here (Curtis 2015, Wong 2015).

Observed and projected trends of global CO2 emissions and the warming consequence - under four RCP scenarios (Sanford 2014).

However, opposition questions the funding – with Greenpeace (2015) suggesting that the governmental subsidies will provide £1.1 billion public costs a year, despite the fact that the borrowing needs have drastically been reduced with further Chinese investment. Furthermore, Greenpeace highlights the fact that the fixed electricity price will mean £81 billion will be generated from electricity sales in the 35 years of the fixed cost. France and China therefore receive around £30 billion and £15 billion from the tax payer, once maintenance and construction costs are accounted for (Kahya 2015). Some would argue that this level of capital leaving the country is diabolical and will limit UK economic growth. The 25,000 UK jobs created are unlikely to compensate for this calculated monetary emigration. 

Future trends and possibilities. Part 2

The future of nuclear may not solely be within electricity (Hill 2008), with the reactors also capable of providing services such as heat generation and desalination of marine water. Therefore the future expansion may be in both capacity and number of uses!

Electricity demand is on the increase, for example the US demand is predicted to increase 30% by 2035 (Ferguson 2010) – explaining as to why there is vast nuclear investment, in order to provide a stable supply for the coming years. Especially with the increased realisation of the risk of  fossil fuel depletion! It is predicted that 7,200 GW of energy will need to be produced to keep up with the increasing global demands (IEA 2014) – this will not only be fulfilled by new power plants and renewable sources but there will also be a need for the replacement of ageing nuclear reactors (IEA 2014). Many reactors are deemed to have a 40 year life, yet extensions on this in the US have realised the potential for up to 80 (Hill 2008). This would suggest the infrastructure of today will be influential within the future of nuclear energy.

Energy consumption predicted trends - increases in demand may be fulfilled by the zero-carbon option of nuclear - in particular large increases in Asia. Predicted nuclear growth in China is likely to be a response of this increased Asian demand (IEA 2009).

The IEA (2014) have produced scenarios of future nuclear trends, with it believed an increase in capacity from 392 to 620 GW between 2013 and 2040. It is seen that the major growth will occur within areas with regulated and guaranteed prices, private investment, public subsidies or aid in attracting outside funding (IEA 2014). Predominant growth is likely to be based in China, which is predicted to account for 45% of this growth 2013-2040, with India, South Korea and Russia combining to provide a further 30% of the growth (IEA 2014). However, within this scenario the global share of nuclear energy remains steady at 12% which is below the % provided at its peak in previous years –this is presumably based on the expanding alternate renewable sources in the scenario (IEA 2014). Public opposition and safety regulations may limit the exponential growth, with favouritism towards more acceptable sources such as solar and wind. Despite the absolute capacity increasing, its significance within a global energy picture is predicted to remain small. This perhaps confirms nuclear to be rooted in position as a stable, baseline provider, incapable of breaking free of its restraints to challenge the global energy dominance of fossil fuels.

However, increased nuclear presence on a global scope can improve fuel security, removing the dependence on imports and the fluctuating international fuel prices (IEA 2014). Therefore, despite no significant percentage increase predicted by the IEA, it is seen that more countries will initiate nuclear sectors to allow for a more predictable and stable, internal economy.

There is much importance on the carbon-free nature of nuclear, with it predicted that nuclear energy has prevented 52 gigatonnes of CO2 from being emitted into the atmosphere since 1971 (IEA 2014). Predictions for the emission reductions under the 2040 IEA scenarios suggest South Korea could cut emission by 50% and China 8% for example. The future environment therefore would benefit from such absolute increases in nuclear production, a future of reduced air pollution and lowered radiative forcing is a possibility. It is estimated that for every 22 tonnes of uranium used in nuclear energy production, there for a prevention of 1 million tonnes of CO2 if coal is used alternatively (WNA 2015). Add onto this the economic potential of reduced emissions, with the potential to remove costs of $80/tonne of CO2 emission (IEA 2014), if an economic value is applied.

The shift from fossil fuel to nuclear can have health improvements for the future also – which may appear strange after so many health risks have been mentioned in previous case studies. However, it is predicted that 1.34 million premature deaths are caused every year through the inhaling of particulate matter (WNA 2015), for example the black carbon was predicted to have caused around 30,000 premature deaths just in the UK in 2008 (Yim 2012). These emissions are supplied by the incomplete combustion of fossil fuels (Koelmans 2006) – therefore shifting to nuclear energy would improve air quality and allow for countries to comply with clean air legislative requirements. These health risks may be on a lower scale than the potential nuclear damage, yet the higher frequency of particulate matter damage can be prevented in a nuclear future.

Despite all these potential opportunities and blockades, it is clear to me that there are many reasons as to why facilitating a nuclear future would be a positive move (WNA 2015):

•           Increased global population and energy demand -  As well as increasing pressure on freshwater resources may mean high energy nuclear reactors will be essential in desalination and ensuring water, as well as energy security in the future.
•          Climate change - Nuclear provides a stable and continual energy supply, with a quick set up rate and a zero carbon emission from energy production.
•           Security of supply - Nuclear allows an autonomous energy supply, removing the vulnerability to international fossil fuel prices and transportation needs.
•          Economics - In areas with carbon pricing the clear monetary value of nuclear is emphasized against fossil fuels. Furthermore, with stable costs in regards to fuel costs it will be preferential for consumers.
•           Security from future price jumps - Nuclear is moving from smaller projects to global, private sector programmes. The mass production of reactors will reduce times and costs and therefore in hand reduce the prices needed to make a return. If anything, costs may decrease with greater experience. An issue, as mentioned in the “costs” blog, is the fact that uranium sources may have to be extracted with greater difficulty and therefore wider expansions of nuclear could induce an initial increase in costs. However the positives mentioned above will likely outweigh any initial cost requirements!

Nuclear may be more beneficial for the environment, through zero-emission electricity production, than was previously thought (Cartoon Movement 2010).

Future trends and possibilities. Part 1

Many of the blog posts have looked at the constraints of a nuclear expansion – here I am going to look at the benefits as well as the current trends for nuclear energy to increase in the coming years. The current electric production from nuclear amounts to 11% of global demand (WNA 2015). This is provided by 435 reactors producing 375,000 MWe energy. From 1990-2010 the global production increased around 18%, this increasing trend therefore promotes the strong possibility that further future expansions are likely to amount. 70 reactors are currently under construction which would provide an extra 20% of the current electricity capacity (WNA 2015) – showing signs that the nuclear future is emerging already.

Electricity production trend - general increase since the 1970s. Slight decline in the 2010s is likely attributable to the closures following the Fukushima disaster (WNA 2015).

Many governments have plans for the future increases for example the UK government in 2006 applied plans to replace the ageing reactors with new ones, to continue a reliance on nuclear – along with new reactors to increase the capacity further, including Hinkley Point C (WNA 2015). Not only are there plans for expansions in counties that have had a long history of nuclear such as France and the UK, but also many new countries are looking to exploit nuclear such as Vietnam and Turkey. Another example in the Middle East, Iran has recently establishing its first power station and the UAE are central to the construction of 3 South Korean 1,450 Mwe reactors (WNA 2015). The capacity as well as the spatial scope of nuclear energy is therefore enhancing currently – progressing to a larger nuclear future?

Current levels of nuclear generation per country (WNA 2015).

The Bushehr Nuclear Plant in Iran - which opened in 2010 (Guardian 2010).

The economic investment risk is substantial in nuclear plant construction, therefore it will often be seen that governmental aid or regulation is essential for the private nuclear sector to fund nuclear projects. For example the Price Anderson Act in the US caps private insurance costs at $200 million, otherwise if costs were allowed to be classified in relation to the possible risks the expenditures would likely be too high for profitability to be achieved (Balzani 2006). The Bush government asked Congress for a $40 billion fund for a project known as “Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (Balzani 2006). The plan would be to provide nuclear potential to developing countries that would not have the internal funds necessary to self-sufficiently manage a nuclear energy sector. The agreement would see spent fuel returned to the supplier nation, which may be seen as a national security precaution. What this programme provided was the potential for the vast expansion of nuclear on a global scale – yet at the same time it could be argued that the autonomy of developing nations was reduced and that a dependency on the US and their regulations and rules increased (Balzani 2006). Moral and political dilemmas may arise from this trade-off, which could potentially delay or prevent the nuclear growth.

The US desire for a nuclear future was further displayed by the Obama government providing $8.3 billion funding for two new reactors – whilst once again going to Congress for a further $36 billion to fund similar reactor setup projects. This financial assistance is required to allow the nuclear expansion but also to allow nuclear to be economically competitive against fossil fuels (Ferguson 2010). Another way that has been suggested to drive a greater level of nuclear competiveness is through carbon pricing/taxing (Ferguson 2010). Placing a value on the emissions will allow for the environmental costs to be included within cost-benefit analyses within businesses. With the increased economic damages of “dirty fuels” a greater demand for nuclear will be provided.

Ferguson (2010) also suggests that merging alliances will provide greater investor opportunities – especially needed within the US where a lack of state owned utilities means private investment is essential. An example being the global connections between French EDF and the US Company Constellation Energy. Similar global alliances have recently been seen with EDF selling a share in the Hinkley C, Somerset project to the state owned China General Nuclear Power (Farrell 2015) – arguably global funding may be the future for such wider expansions of nuclear energy to be achieved!

Global alliances, such as that between the UK and China, may become a common theme in future nuclear investments (Guardian 2015). 

The UK government has ensured a minimum electricity price to EDF for Hinkley Point C at £89.50 per MW/hr for 35 years (BBC 2015), due to the need for a guaranteed return to promote the initial private investment. Similar guarantees were also put in place to entice the Chinese investors. It may be argued that this cost is relatively high compared to the $40-$50 cost of a barrel of oil – however when placed in comparison to other renewable energy products it would appear relatively reasonable (BBC 2015). The issue being that these governmental subsidies and guarantees will be required to allow for the construction and economic competitivity, otherwise higher initial costs are likely to mitigate its demand. There is an inability for nuclear to function within a free market, that otherwise it will continually be out-competed by the more environmentally damaging, yet cheaper energy resources (The Economist 2015).

Price per Mw/h - displaying the guaranteed price for Hinkley C electricity to be reasonable in relation to alternate renewable sources (BBC 2015).

Nuclear energy costs are often far more stable in relation to fossil fuel fluctuations, however the efficiencies and therefore the costs between nuclear plants tend to be variable (The Economist 2015). For example the US cost of nuclear production is $24/MWh on average, which is lower than both coal and gas – however variability in such costs either side of this average means such benefits are not always widely experienced. Additionally, there is the threat of ever increasingly cheap fossil fuels, including the declining US gas prices. With the high setup costs for nuclear it would appear as if the US is likely to rely on the economically viable gas option in the coming years (The Economist 2015). Despite the governmental assistance towards nuclear energy, it is claimed that in the West there is a preference to subsidise alternate renewable sources that are major competitors to the nuclear potential (The Economist 2015). This is likely to be a product of political and public acceptance of solar and wind over nuclear. Subsidising acceptable energy sources will allow for greater governmental support than funding a sector that many see as a potential risk.

Balzani (2006) suggests that for nuclear energy to significantly provide for future global energy needs it would need to continually produce energy up to 10TW, this would therefore require 10,000 1 Gwe power plants to be built – if such significant contributions are going to be achieved then a new reactor would have to be opened every other day for the next 50 years. This statement lacks substance, I am not entirely sure what a “significant contribution” is, however it does highlight the lack of current nuclear potential. This emphasises its role as a background, baseline provider, that major expansions will be needed if it is to become a dominant energy source. Such construction requirements seem impossible, yet evidence to show that a new power reactor was started every 17 days in the 1980s does provide some hope for a rapid change to be possible (WNA 2015). The estimates for contemporary potential from the WNA (2015), claims that a 1Gwe plant opening every 5 days is feasible – therefore this displays the ability to potentially significantly contribute within short periods of time. This rapid production ability is important – as climatic change concerns become ever more urgent as potential thresholds are being approached. The more rapid the response in reducing the emissions, the lower magnitude the peak temperature increase will be (IPCC 2007). Climatic change is arguably inevitable with the current atmospheric composition, yet a reduction as soon as possible will mitigate the damage already caused!

Nuclear predictions under different scenarios (Hill 2008).

Is nuclear a waste of time? Part 2

The costs of waste disposal are vast, often accounting for 10% of the overall pricing (WNA 2015). Costs are contextually variable yet persistently high, with the waste disposal including the costs in exploration of suitable geologically stable sites, the engineering needs for the storage and also administrative costs to name a few (IAEA 2014). For example the lowest expenditure was $1.1 billion by India and the greatest was a staggering $19.5 billion spent by South Korea (IAEA 2014).

Costs of nuclear waste disposal for South Korea (IAEA 2014).

One of the answers is reprocessing, with it claimed in 2000 by the British Nuclear Fuel that 97% of nuclear waste can be recycled and reused (BBC 2000). Whether this potential is capable of being fulfilled however is another question. The reprocessing is predominantly focused on the conversion of “fertile uranium to fissile plutonium” (WNA 2015) – with it believed that an extra 25-30% of energy can be derived from the uranium that has already been processed initially. This would tie in with the previous blog on the costs of nuclear energy, as more energy would be generated for every $ spent of excavation for uranium for example.

Three general methods of reprocessing are available from the use of heat; electric currents or fluids in order to seperate the metals and allow access to the plutonium which can be engaged with as fuel (WNA 2015). The per $ excavation improvements however are seen to be made redundant by the fact that reprocessing is currently not economically viable within the French EDF company (WNA2015). That due to the impurities in uranium then the conversion costs are often 3x greater than the use of new uranium – this may therefore limit reprocessing and reduced global waste from being achieved on a vast scale. However, it may be seen that once the uranium stores are depleted this may force reprocessing as an essential practice; the necessity may provide the stimulus for innovation and reduced costs which may allow for greater reprocessing opportunities.

The lack of economic viability may explain for the limited level of global reprocessing – with the current global capacity at 4,500 tonnes of waste a year – compared to the 300 million tonnes that are produced each year ONLY from OECD countries (WNA 2015). Arguably, this shows the near negligible ability reprocessing currently has, but it must also be acknowledged as a step in the correct direction. The policies of waste are internationally variable with the UK and France promoting reprocessing, compared to Canada and Sweden for example that have policies in place for disposal (WNA 2015). The USA is seen to have a prevention of reprocessing that was put in place in 1974 under the presidency of Jimmy Carter (Forbes 2014). It was prevented due to the lack of cost-effectiveness and the danger of it being utilised as a threat to national security – however it seems ridiculous that a valuable resource is being wasted when it could aid the emission reductions of a country run by oil. The waste production would drop by 50% if the ban was lifted (Forbes 2014) – the USA more than anyone, with the vast emission production, is in drastic need of utilising every carbon-free resource available rather than simply “throwing it away”.

This leads to the difficult trade-off between safety and renewable energy – is the waste permanently sealed off in storage for safety purposes or is it left open, as it may become an increasingly valuable resource for future generations (WNA 2015).

Japan, as mentioned, has had a complicated relationship with nuclear energy for years – however despite large negativity from much of the public, two plants were agreed to be reopened in the Spring of this year (Normile 2015). The issue being that this will add further waste to the 17,000 tonnes that are currently within cooling pools. There is a strong desire for reprocessing yet the reprocessing plant constructions have been substantially delayed and therefore excess fuel will continue to be created – the planned opening is March 2016 (Normile 2015). The Redox extraction method looks to separate the useful uranium and plutonium from the used fuel, this would consequently vastly reduce the level of waste – however disposal of the highly radioactive residue byproduct will remain an issue. One method tested is vitrification where the by-product is inserted within glass – it is deemed more durable than the metal storage in commercial use. However, the complex chemistry and high costs are likely to limit its expanded use (Normile 2015). 

Such alternative storages are needed in particular within Japan due to the fact that the underground storage is prevented as geological stability is unlikely to persist for long periods due to the sensitivity of the global location – along with the negative stigma that has arisen from a history of nuclear disasters. This means many will oppose the storage of nuclear waste anywhere in their proximity (Normile 2015). NIMBYism therefore arises again. Furthermore, an ever increasing concern will be the room for storage if it is continually produced and in need of safe storage for 1000s of years. There is only limited areas of suitable geological stability where deep storage is permissible. This had led to some suggestions of disposing of waste in outer space (Burns 1978)!

Despite this there is hope! Research from the University of Sheffield claims the volume of waste could be reduced by up to 90% by using burn furnace slag from metal refineries in the vitrification process (UOS 2013). This would reduce previous vitrification costs and overcome the concern of limited storage space. Waste would be reduced using other waste, a win-win scenario!

Vitrification - the answer to nuclear waste storage concerns?

It is clear there is much room for potential growth within reprocessing which could ultimately end this particular critical attack of nuclear energy. Often the radioactivity longevity may be over exaggerated in the media and society - therefore the risks are unlikely to persist for as long as many fear. Despite this it remains a great issue, the trade off between permanent sealing for safety or providing access for future use is one of the largest challenges - predominantly due to future technological advances being unknown. My opinion here is that waste in inevitable within energy production whether it is nuclear, fossil fuels or even solar energy which is seen to produce toxic waste water and carbon emissions during the panel construction (Nunez 2011). If nuclear is going to be a stopgap before more acceptable renewable resources are capable of fulfilling demand then these challenges will only be temporary issues. Therefore, dealing with and accepting these problems - whether it is through increasing reprocessing efforts or continuing to safely store - is essential to receive the high levels of carbon free energy that are urgently required today.

Solar panel construction also contributes to high levels of waste (Nunez 2011).

An issue that will be expanded upon within the next few posts will be the link to warfare and terrorism, with nuclear waste production "tightly and ambiguously linked with weaponry technology" (Armaroli 2006). Costs and fears of waste disposal sites and nuclear plants are therefore further increased by the security measures required to limit such potential energy falling into the wrong hands?!

Is nuclear a "waste" of time? Part 1

Two of the major challenges that nuclear energy faces is the production and disposal of nuclear waste. Often the greatest concerns are attached to the high level waste which is made up of the used nuclear fuel (WNA 2015), with the inclusion of fission products (WNA 2015). However, this contributes 3% of the total waste, with 90% classified as low level which includes clothing or tools that may have experienced a minimal level of radioactive exposure (WNA2015). The issue being that Uranium-235/238 which is used within the energy production have half-lives of 704 million years and 4.46 billion years respectively (IEER 2012). Therefore the storage has to be secure for many years to prevent the radionuclide material entering the biosphere, which as seen from the two previous case studies can have substantial health risks. Often it is initially stored within water to both cool the waste and to act as a shield to the radioactivity (WNA 2015). Greenpeace, a publicised opponent to nuclear energy, uses the long-term decay to argue against the expansion of the sector. They suggest there is no guarantee that the dangerous material will not enter the environment over such a prolonged persistence (Greenpeace 2006).

Nuclear waste stored in a cooling pool (WNA 2015).

There has been evidence to support these claims, for example there is evidence of the corrosion resistance alloys, often used in the storage, being exposed to the risk of localised corrosion and consequent seepage (Feron 2008). The localised corrosion may be from exfoliation corrosion in relation to the surrounding sediment or “pitting” of the barrel’s surface if it is highly exposed (Frankel 2008). Furthermore evidence from Hanford, Manhattan showed how the seepage of nuclear waste into the groundwater caused large detrimental health effects (Hanson 2000). This would be a particular concern when looking at the potential for a wide scale nuclear expansion – with much of the arid and semi-arid parts of the world highly dependent on groundwater as a freshwater resource (Taylor 2013). Consequently, many may be reluctant to risk a decline in the vital resource's quality by introducing nuclear energy.

The susceptibility of the groundwater is due to the fact that much of the high level waste is stored in deep geological areas (WNA 2015). Low and intermediate level waste is capable of being stored nearer the surface due to the limited risks  in contrast to the used nuclear fuel (WNA 2015). Storage in stable geological formations in essential, which for example raises a greater challenge for certain countries such as Japan that are unlikely to have geological areas that are stable for long enough periods due to the seismic susceptibility (Normile 2015). Despite the potential threats and concerns there are many established safety standards managed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the European Commission and the Nuclear Energy Agency to name just a few (WNA 2015)! These aid in the formation of national policies and legislation in regards to internationally agreed safety standards. This displays nuclear waste storage to take safety strongly into consideration and therefore the risks may once again by general public exaggerations. However, as seen by Fukushima even if such safety procedures are in place the potential for disaster is still apparent!

Further concerns arise with the transgenerational effect. The radioactive waste management impacts future generations, despite these future popualtions not directly benefiting from the original use (La Porte 1978). Therefore suggesting a socially unjust procedure that is far too short sighted.

However, for all the issues and media exaggerations surrounding the waste, there is evidence to suggest that the issues are perhaps not as great as one would initially suspect. For example nuclear energy produces 200,000m3 low and intermediate waste and 10,000m3 of high level waste annual on a global scale (WNA 2015). This is relatively low when compared to other forms of energy, therefore the singling out of nuclear as being the one energy sector that generates large amounts of waste would be incorrect. Furthermore, unlike other waste products it is seen that the risk diminishes overtime as the radioactive isotopes decay (WNA 2015) – this contrasts fossil fuel CO2 emissions, for example that provides a continually high radiative forcing effect (IPCC 2013). Arguably the threat of climate change is of far greater probability and magnitude on a planetary scale than nuclear – therefore the waste of nuclear surely should be viewed as preferential in contrast the continued climatic warming and ecosystem degradation?

I am not sure eating the nuclear waste is the answer to the storage issue?!

Another point to make is that the claims by Greenpeace and other oppositions that the threats can last millions of years are potentially false. That it may “only” be 1,000 years before the radioactivity decays to a level that is similar to the natural levels in uranium ore within the geology (WNA 2015). The only difference may be that the concentration is higher and therefore would still be seen to provide a greater level of risk than its natural counterpart. This mitigates the longevity of the issue, but 1,000 years is still a vast period of time that will continue to provide a substantial challenge for waste management. This is central to the persistent public fear and negativity towards nuclear waste, based upon imagery of mutations and apparently imaginations of nuclear waste initiating an apocalyptic destruction leading to a rebirth of society (Slovic 1991)?! The contestation and NIMBYism of nuclear waste is therefore likely to limit the locations for storage.

The radioactive decay may reach natural levels within 1,000 years - despite a half life of U-238 for example extending to 4.5 billion years (BBC 2014).

The fears are not solely directed towards health, for example NIMBYism is likely to arise  with evidence to show how house prices dropped greatly with nuclear waste transport routes directed through areas of South Carolina (Gawande 2001).